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Abstract 
 
This study empirically examined whether the zero lower bound policy of 2008 promotes 
managerial risk-taking using samples of U.S. publicly traded firms. Based on the 
evidence documented in previous research, this policy can lead to a change in firms’ 
managerial risk-taking and in turn result in a difference in executive compensation. By 
conducting empirical research, it was found that managerial risk taking increases 
significantly after the zero lower bound policy. In addition, firms’ total executive 
compensation also increased significantly after the zero lower bound policy. Further 
analysis showed that the increase in executive compensation was caused by the partial 
mediation of managerial risk-taking. Moreover, robustness checks showed that the 
relation between zero lower bound policy and managerial risk-taking is less significant 
for S&P 500 firms. In addition, corporate governance moderates the relation between 
managerial risk-taking and executive compensation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
After the financial crisis of 2008, the U.S. Federal Reserve implemented a zero lower bound 
policy, which lowered the short-term nominal interest rate to nearly zero. The initial decision was 
followed by a series of announcements resulting in the zero lower bound policy being effective 
until the end of 2015. The U.S. Federal Reserve first announced lowering the interest rate to 
0-0.25% on December 16th, 2008. Following this first announcement, a string of announcements 
were made to keep the nominal interest rate at the same level after every FOMC meeting. The 
Federal Reserve insists that the zero lower bound policy supports “continued progress toward 
maximum employment and price stability”, and that “the current 0 to 1/4 percent target range for 
the federal funds rate remains appropriate” (Board of Governors of FRS, 12/17/14).  
 
On the other hand, researchers and policy makers have criticized the zero lower bound policy for 
squeezing corporate profit growth (Gross, 11/3/15), and that this policy can lead to a liquidity 
trap and leave central banks helpless to provide macroeconomic stimulus (McCallum, 2000; 
Orphanides and Wieland, 2000). Others in the media also hold the view that even though the 
economic growth rate is not particularly strong, the job market in the U.S is rather healthy. 
Therefore a rise in the interest rate is needed (Walker, 9/17/15). On December 17th, 2015, the 
Federal Reserve decided to increase the Fed’s target rate from the original 0-0.25% to a range of 
0.25-0.50 percentage points (Reuters, 2015). This marked the end of a seven-year-long zero 
lower bound policy in the U.S. economy.  
 
Since the implementation of the zero lower bound policy, it received broad attention from both 
researchers and practitioners. There is a string of literature focusing on examining the zero lower 
bound policy impact on banks and money funds. The documented results show that a lower 
monetary policy rate increases risk-taking in banks’ lending behavior by relaxing the bank capital 
2	
	
constraint that is present due to moral hazard problems (Adrian and Shin, 2010). In addition, the 
zero lower bound policy also results in public pension funds allocating a larger proportion of 
their assets to risky investments (Boubaker et al., 2015).  
 
However all of the previous literature focused on the zero lower bound policy’s impact on 
financial institutions rather than general firms. Therefore there is a need to bring up the question 
of whether this policy also has a significant impact on firms of other industries. Based on 
documented results, companies besides banks and money funds will also pursue risky projects as 
a result of the zero lower bound policy. This study empirically examined the relation between 
zero lower bound policy and managerial risk-taking. Previous research on zero lower bound 
policy’s effect on banks leads to a prediction that it also has a positive effect on corporate 
managerial risk-taking beyond the financial industry. Besides studying the relation between zero 
lower bound policy and managerial risk-taking, this study also investigated the relation between 
managerial risk-taking and executive compensation.  
 
As previous research showed, even though shareholders and CEOs are both risk adverse, 
shareholders can turn intorisk-neutral after diversifying away the idiosyncratic risk by investing 
in portfolios. Therefore, risk neutral shareholders will encourage CEOs to make risky 
investments for risky projects that may generate more profit for the firm (Jafri and Trabelsi, 
2014). However, since managers cannot diversify away the risk, they have to make investment 
decisions that are best for their current as well as their future career. So they avoid investing in 
risky projects, even if the projects tend to enhance firm value (Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992).  
 
When CEOs are encouraged to take more risk, they tend to protect themselves by generating 
excess compensation (Jafri and Trabelsi, 2014). Therefore, one can predict that when managerial 
risk increases, there is also an increase in executive compensation. In the setting of this study, 
one then predicts that since zero lower bound policy promotes managerial risk-taking, it will also 
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result in an increase in executive compensation. Managerial risk-taking is the mediator in this 
relation.  
 
To test these hypotheses, the study used a sample of U.S. publicly traded companies and their 
executives’ compensation for two periods, before and after the zero lower bound policy. Firm 
managerial risk taking was proxied by using investment, R&D expenditure and capital 
expenditure (Bargeron et al., 2010). Executive compensation was estimated as the average 
executive total compensation documented in the Execucomp database. There was control for the 
effects of other variables, such as firm size, total debt, sales growth, earnings before interest and 
tax, and market to book ratio, which are believed to have an impact on the relations (Bargeron et 
al., 2010). 
 
Results of this study showed that there is a significant relation between zero lower bound policy 
and managerial risk taking. In turn, it leads to an increase in executive compensation. The 
empirical analysis revealed that after zero lower bound policy was implemented after 2008, there 
was an increase both in firms’ managerial risk taking and executive total compensation. There 
were also tests to show that the increase in executive compensation was caused by the partial 
mediation effect of managerial risk-taking. At the same time, zero lower bound policy can have a 
direct impact on executive total compensation. 
 
This study contributes to current literature that examines the micro-impact of zero lower bound 
policy on companies. This analysis consisted of three parts: the relation between zero lower 
bound policy and managerial risk-taking; the relation between managerial risk-taking and 
executive compensation after zero lower bound policy; and the mediation effect of managerial 
risk-taking. This study is an extension to the Di Maggio and Kacperczyk (2014) study and 
further analyzed zero lower bound policy’s impact on managerial risk-taking variation and even 
executive compensation. 
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The study results can also be of use to practitioners. This study is not only important to the U.S. 
market but is also important to the world economy. Zero lower bound policy was also 
implemented by other economies such as the Eurozone, U.K., and Japan. A negative interest rate 
policy of -0.1% was imposed in Japan on February 16, 2016. Before Japan, the Eurozone already 
had a negative interest rate. Still, this is a first for the world’s third-largest economy. The Bank of 
Japan stated “the Bank of Japan will cut interest rates further into negative territory if judged as 
necessary”. The intention of this negative interest rate policy is to achieve an inflation target of 2% 
(BBC News, 1/29/16). 
 
With the large-scale implementation of zero lower bound policy, the study results provided 
insights of its influence on general firms and should be considered by policy makers when they 
evaluate the impact of zero lower bound policy on the economy. For possible future studies 
concerning the negative interest rate policy, the study results can also provide guidance. The 
study can also be of importance to investors and boards of directors so they can better understand 
executive’s risk-taking behavior after zero lower bound policy. 
 
This remainder of this document is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a discussion of 
related literature and the hypotheses development. Section 3 describes the methodology, sample, 
and data used for empirical tests. Section 4 contains the results of the relations between zero 
lower bound policy, managerial risk-taking and executive compensation. Section 5 provides 
robustness tests to support the main hypotheses. Section 6 concludes and provides possible future 
extensions. 


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2. Related literature and hypotheses development  
 
 
This section reviews the literature on managerial risk-taking and executive compensation and 
then develops the hypotheses concerning their relations with zero lower bound policy. 
2.1  Zero lower bound policy and managerial risk-taking 
 
It is widely proved by various streams of literature that external policies can have an impact on 
firms’ risk-taking. For example, Defond et al. (2014) suggest that IFRS adoption affects firm 
level “crash risk”, which is the frequency of extreme negative stock returns. Academics and 
policy makers have always supported the idea to introduce a complementary macro-prudential 
framework to make sure of financial stability (Hanson, Kashyap and Stein, 2010). In addition, 
Vazquez and Federico (2015) find that country-specific macroeconomic environment plays an 
important role in the likelihood of bank failure. They also prove that monetary conditions are 
also related with the likelihood of bank failure. Therefore, introducing the impact of macro 
policy on firms when studying risk-taking is a must based on prior literature. 
 
Zero lower bound policy is a decision that the U.S. Federal Reserve made that aimed to lower the 
short-term nominal interest rates to zero after the financial crisis of 2007-2008. The initial 
announcement of zero lower bound policy was made in December 2008. Even though it was 
proposed as a short-term policy, a series of later announcements were made stating that this 
short-term rate would stay near zero for a longer time period. This policy was in effect until 
December 2015.  
 
Since this policy was implemented, there has been an intense debate on whether it has positive or 
negative effects on the national economy. The Federal Reserve insists that this policy has made 
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continuing progress toward maximum employment and price stability. Thus, zero lower bound 
policy should still be effective until employment and price goals are reached. There is evidence 
showing that the zero lower bound policy can help central banks to reduce average inflation rates 
(McCallum, 2000). But at the same time, a similar action in Japan failed to prevent a prolonged 
macroeconomic slump because of the near-zero nominal interest rate, which provides support to 
the critics of zero lower bound policy.  
 
Critics believe that because the nominal interest rate is approximately zero, the central banks are 
helpless to provide macroeconomic stimulus (McCallum, 2000). Goodfriend (2000) held the 
position that nominal interest rates can be negative occasionally and temporarily when needed, 
but not for a long time. Because if zero lower bound policy is in effect for long, it can 
cause liquidity trap and limit the capacity that the central bank has to stimulate economic growth.  
 
Defond et al. (2014) find that crash risk decreases among non-financial firms after they adopt 
IFRS, while crash risk does not change for financial institutions. This suggests a possible 
difference of reaction to external policies. Therefore, this study believes that there is a need to 
analyze the impact of zero lower bound policy even if there is evidence based on financial 
industry documented in previous research. 
 
 
2.1.1 Possible positive impact of zero lower bound policy on risk-taking 
 
Before the zero lower bound policy, there was already a stream of literature studying monetary 
policy’s impact on managerial risk taking. Most recently, Jiménez G et al. (2014) studied the 
issue using Spanish bank data and found that a low overnight interest rate can lead to risker 
lending. This result was found by comparing banks’ lending volume, borrowers’ ex-ante risk, and 
loans’ chance of default. In conclusion, this stream of research reached the conclusion that 
monetary policy drives banks risk-taking (Jiménez et al., 2014).  
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Even though it was shown that there is a strong relation between monetary policy and risk-taking, 
most research addressed this issue using banks and little has been done using firms in other 
industries besides financial institutions. Thus, this study focused on firms that were outside the 
financial industry and studied their risk-taking behavior due to monetary policy interest rate 
change. Following Di Maggio and Kacperczyk (2014), this study found that the U.S. zero lower 
bound policy is an optimal situation to solve the problems at hand.  
 
Di Maggio and Kacperczyk (2014) empirically examined the zero lower bound policy’s impact 
on U.S. money funds. They found that money funds tend to invest in risker assets in response to 
the zero lower bound policy’s initial announcement and the following announcements, which 
declared the zero interest rates would be maintained. Similarly, Kim and Olivan (2015) also 
suggest that low interest rate is associated with excessive risk taking for mutual funds. Mutual 
funds take higher risk for they want to attract new money and more investors. But as empirical 
results show, the cost of high returns in fact offset the profit. Therefore, this increased risk-taking 
does not benefit investors. They all support a strong interaction between unconventional low 
interest rate policy and mutual funds’ risk-taking behavior (Chodorow-Reich, 2014). 
 
Besides the study of this policy’s impact on the money fund industry, previous studies examined 
its impact on the banking industry. The results were consistent. They all found that as a result of 
low interest rates, banks will increase risk-taking in lending and less-capitalized banks even lend 
to riskier firms (Adrian and Shin, 2010; Jiménez et al., 2014; Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011). 
 
As a result of banks’ softening their lending standards, firms that didn’t have capital resources 
due to high firm risk could now have access to more capital and thus invest in risky portfolios. 
Besides the case for risky firms, Maddaloni and Peydró (2011) confirmed that in general, lower 
short-term interest rates would soften banks’ lending standards for retail and corporate loans, 
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resulting in more available capital resources for firms. With banks’ lower interest rates and 
relaxed lending standards, companies are expected to invest more in risky portfolios, hoping to 
generate higher returns.  
 
In addition, since zero lower bound policy results in a decrease in bank profit, bank owners will 
seek to compensate for the utility loss from this capital regulation by increasing bank risk 
(Laeven and Levine, 2009). Evidence documented in previous research showed that this same 
rule also applies to companies in other industries. Buser et al. (1981) found that owners might 
compensate for the loss of utility due to more stringent capital requirements by selecting a risker 
investment portfolio. Therefore, when companies’ profits are reduced because of the zero lower 
bound policy, management may seek to invest in risky assets to compensate for their losses.  
 
Altunbas et al. (2009) find that unusually low interest rates over an extended period of time 
cause an increase in banks’ risk taking. They believe that the low interest rate can affect banks in 
three ways. Firstly, it can affect cash flows and incomes, and in turn impact how bank measure 
risk (Adrian and Shin, 2009). Secondly, since low interest rate can lead to low returns on 
investment, managers will take more risk to meet the target nominal return (Brunnermeier, 2001). 
Thirdly, it can also induce a decrease in risk aversion by banks and other investors. Changes in 
risk perception and risk tolerance due to monetary policy are studied by Borio and Zhu (2012).  
 
Looking at the evidence documented in previous research, there is sufficient reason to believe 
that zero lower bound policy has an impact on firms’ managerial risk-taking. But since all prior 
studies focused on the banking and money fund industries, this study used firm samples not 
limited to those industries. As a result, this study contributes to this stream of literature by adding 
further evidence of zero lower bound policy’s impact on managerial risk-taking across all 
industries.  
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This study has the following first hypothesis: 
 
H1a: There is an increase in managerial risk-taking after the implementation of zero lower 
bound policy. 
 
2.1.2 Possible negative impact of zero lower bound policy on risk-taking 
 
With all the evidence supporting the positive impact of zero lower bound policy on firms’ 
managerial risk-taking, there is also the possibility that the impact can be negative. There are two 
possible reasons as to why zero lower bound policy might result in a decrease in firms’ 
managerial risk-taking. This relationship is illustrated in this section. 
 
On one hand, public saving goes down as a result of low nominal interest rates, and therefore 
banks lack funds to lend to companies. Thus, companies cannot get many loans from banks and 
do not invest in risky projects due to inadequate cash flow. It was already shown that when banks 
are unable to raise enough funds to continue lending, their loan supply would decease and in turn 
affect their bank-dependent borrowing (Kishan and Opiela, 2000). Gambacorta and Mistrulli 
(2004) studied the difference in response of lending to monetary policy due to differences in 
capital ratios. They found that well-capitalized banks are less affected by monetary policy 
because they have better access to non-deposit fund-raising. 
 
In other words, banks’ funding is affected by interest rate change, even though the impact degree 
can differ based on their access to non-deposit funds. Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) also point 
out that when studying regulations, it is necessary to consider the macroeconomic consequences 
on banks. As a result of banks loosing deposit funds, there is a possibility that firms couldn’t 
borrow enough money from banks and decrease their risk-taking. 
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On the other hand, since zero lower bound policy is squeezing banks’ profit growth (Gross, 
11/3/15), banks are less willing to lend to companies. According to Giulioni (2015), when a 
policy announces a decrease in interest rate, it implies a reduction of interest rate charged on 
corporate loans. In turn, banks’ average rate of return will shrink. Since corporate loans cannot 
generate the desired profit for banks, they become less willing to provide loans. This causal 
relationship was discussed in detail by Goyal and McKinnon (2003) using Japanese sample 
firms.  
 
Japan was the first nation that started to use zero lower bound policy in modern times. Therefore, 
studying the consequences of Japanese zero lower bound policy can provide guidance to the U.S. 
market. The result of implementing zero lower bound policy is pushing the lending interest rates 
towards zero and thus squeezing banks’ profit margins. When banks earn less profit from lending, 
it becomes impossible for them to write off previous bad loans using current profit. This implies 
that Japanese banks cannot earn enough profit to cover the losses they generate from past and 
current loans. In order to solve this problem, banks have the intention to raise lending rates.  
 
However they are not able to raise interest rates significantly due to two possible reasons. They 
might lose credit-worthy clients as a result of raising lending rates. Another possibility is that 
small and medium companies, banks’ primary clients, would raise their risk of default if banks 
raise lending rates because these companies are already heavily indebted. Therefore, this only 
leaves banks with one option to maximize their profit and minimize their loss: decrease 
commercial lending and getting more low-transaction-cost government bonds (Goyal and 
McKinnon, 2003). From the companies’ point of view, banks are reluctant to make new loans so 
firms are not getting enough funds from banks. Finally, companies aren’t able to make risky 
investments due to insufficient funding. 
 
Based on these two possible reasons, the following hypothesis is stated: 
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H1b: There is a decrease in managerial risk-taking after the implementation of zero lower bound 
policy. 
 
2.2  Zero lower bound, managerial risk-taking, and executive 
compensation 
Choi and Kronlund (2014) find that when funds change their investment portfolio to reach for 
yield, they experience increased cash flow. This indicates that investor react positively to funds’ 
higher risk-taking behavior. Similar conclusions are drawn by Rajan (2013) and Borio and Zhu 
(2012). They all indicate low interest rate policy promotes investors to reach for yield and take 
higher risk. As a result, theses funds generate higher return (Choi and Kronlund, 2014). Even 
though it is also suggested that the superior performance can be explained by risk-taking rather 
than better skill, investors do invest more money in theses high-risk-taking funds. This suggests 
that investors approve of high risk-taking of money funds and believe that higher risk can 
provide them higher return.  
 
Theoretically, executive compensation should reflect executives’ managerial skill, firm 
performance, their ability to maximize shareholder value, etc. Practically, most firms form 
compensation committees to ensure the rationality of executive compensation plans. The final 
decisions concerning levels and structures of executive pay are often made by outsider directors 
who are aware of the conflicts of interests between shareholders and executives. Therefore, if 
shareholders believe that the investment decisions made by the executives can help them 
generate high profit, they will recognize the effort made by executives and compensate more for 
their better performance. But at the same time, one cannot deny that CEOs and top managers can 
have at least some influence over both their compensation levels and compensation structure 
(Murphy, 1999).  
12	
	
 
Based on agency theory, we know that shareholders and managers have agency problems for 
their goals and desires are different. The underlying problem is the separation of ownership and 
control of the corporation (Garen, 1994). Therefore, even though the manager should be acting in 
the best interests of the shareholders, the manager may not be acting this way in reality.  
 
Among the many conflicts of interests between shareholders and executives, the difference in 
risk preference is one factor that may influence executive pay. Agency theory suggests that 
managers tend to be more risk adverse than shareholders (Eisenhardt, 1989). Even though both 
shareholders and executives are risk adverse, shareholders can diversify away the idiosyncratic 
risk by investing in different stocks and forming portfolios. On the other hand, executives have 
much of their economic wealth as well as their reputation tied to the firm. Thus, they cannot 
diversify away the risk because bad investments may cause them big losses (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992).  
 
Therefore, only executives remain risk adverse with respect to firm performance. Core et al. 
(2003) came up with a theory that risk and return go hand-in-hand and one cannot generate high 
returns without taking high risks. As a result, the main goal for shareholders is to maximize their 
returns. Since high returns are often generated by investments with high risks, shareholders tend 
to favor high-risk investment choices.  
 
But at the same time, executives are not willing to make risky decisions due to two reasons. First, 
their wealth portfolios cannot be diversified as shareholders can because their stock options are 
within the firms. Second, they will receive market penalties if the risky investments they choose 
fail to generate high returns in the end. Market penalties may include a devaluation of the 
executives’ reputations, leading to a negative impact on their future careers in the labor market.  
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Principal-agent theory suggests that companies design executive compensation contracts with the 
intention to yield optimal incentives, thereby motivating the executives to maximize shareholder 
wealth. In the process of designing the contracts, shareholders are aware that executives are risk 
adverse. Thus, they impose more incentives that will generate more compensation for agents for 
increased risk (Conyon, 2006).  
 
Since executives are encouraged to take higher risks, agency theory suggests that they would 
protect themselves by obtaining excess compensation (Jafri and Trabelsi, 2014). They may gain 
excess compensation directly or indirectly. Aboody and Kaszinik (2000) suggested that 
executives might manipulate the company’s stock price to show shareholders that the company 
has good performance and thereby gain excess compensation. Executives may also raise the 
fixed component of their pay and reduce the variable portion to gain excess compensation 
directly (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1998). Either way, they want to make up for the potential in 
their compensation and future career losses generated by taking higher risks. In conclusion, it 
was shown in previous research that there is a positive relation between managers’ risk-taking 
and executive compensation level.  
 
As mentioned in Section 2.1, the implementation of zero lower bound policy may have a positive 
impact on managerial risk-taking. Sufficient evidence was documented in previous research 
supporting the positive relation between managerial risk-taking and executive compensation 
(Chen et al., 2006; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002). Therefore, this study proposed that after the 
implementation of zero lower bound policy, there is an increase in executive compensation. 
Since this policy shouldn’t have a direct impact on executive compensation, this positive relation 
should only exist because of the mediation effect of managerial risk-taking.   
  
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
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H2: The implementation of zero lower bound policy leads to an increase in managerial 
risk-taking, which in turn leads to an increase in executive compensation. 
3. Research design 
This section explains the methodology used to test the hypotheses in this study. By defining the 
independent and dependent variables, it also introduces the samples used and data sources. 
3.1  Sample 
The empirical tests aimed to identify the impact of zero lower bound policy on firms’ managerial 
risk-taking and executive compensation. The sample consisted of 1,480 U.S. publicly traded 
companies for which sufficient data exists in the Compustat and Execucomp databases. The 
sample firms exclude those firms from financial sectors according to Fama and French (1997). 
These firms represent all companies those databases for which there exists consistent data before 
and after the implementation of zero lower bound policy. Specifically, the study required the 
following variables to be available during the 2004-2014 period for companies to be included in 
the sample: capital expenditure, executive total compensation, firms’ book value of asset and 
firms’ market value of asset. Since data on R&D expenditure is small, the study treated missing 
values of R&D expenditures as zero when performing regression analysis.  
3.2  Data 
The fundamental accounting data for sample companies was collected from the Compustat 
database. For every firm in the period of 2004-2014, the following accounting data was collected: 
R&D expenditures, capital expenditures, sale of property plant and equipment, total assets, total 
debt, book value of assets, market value of assets, earnings before interest and tax, and sales. The 
internal governance measure, B-Index, was defined according to Baber et al. (2012). It focused 
mainly on the role of director independence. The variables were defined as indicated in Appendix 
I. 
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Executive compensation data was collected from the Execucomp database. For every firm in the 
period of 2004-2014, the following compensation data was collected: total compensation and 
S&P Index. The study defined the variable TDC as Total Compensation (including Salary, Bonus, 
Other Annual, Total Value of Restricted Stock Granted, Total Value of Stock Options Granted 
(using Black-Scholes, 1973), Long-Term Incentive Payouts, and All Other Total). 
 
There are several traditional measures of risk-taking used in previous research. Abnormal stock 
return volatility and standard deviation of abnormal stock returns is a set of risk-taking measures 
based on market performance (Kravet, 2014; Bova et al., 2014). Based on stock returns, Cole et 
al. (2006) also use the logarithm of the variance of daily stock returns over a certain period of 
time to measure risk. This measure is commonly found in executive compensation literature. In 
addition, idiosyncratic risk is also a risk-taking measure that is commonly used in accounting 
research (Barber et al., 2013). It represents the risk associated with firm’s investment portfolios. 
There is also an accounting measure of risk-taking, which is developed by John et al. (2008), that 
is based on firms’ earnings.  
 
Previous literature also uses research and development expense (R&D) and capital expenditure 
(CAPEX) as risk taking proxies. Evidence documented in prior research consistently shows that 
research and development expense is positively associated with firms’ risk taking, while capital 
expenditure is shown to be both positively (Bargeron et al., 2010; Cohen et al., 2013) and 
negatively (Coles et al., 2006) related to firms’ risk-taking. Following this stream of literature, 
we decide to use the sum of research and development expense and capital expenditure, defined 
as investment, R&D, and CAPEX to be our proxies for firms’ risk-taking.  
 
Laeven and Levine (2009) imply when banks have different corporate governance structures, 
the same regulation can have different effects on their risk taking. John et al., (2008) suggest that 
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ownership structure can have an impact on corporate risk taking. In addition, Agrawal and 
Mandelker (1987) find that there is a negative relation between the degree of managerial control 
and firms’ risk taking. Based on the evidence documented in previous literature, the study 
controlled for governance structure, b-index, in its models. 
4. Empirical results 
 
This section presents the main empirical results. First, the positive relation between the 
implementation of zero lower bound policy is shown. Next, it looks at the mediation effect of 
managerial risk on the relation between the implementation of zero lower bound policy and 
executive compensation.  
 
To test whether managerial risk-taking and executive compensation for publicly traded U.S. 
companies increased significantly after the zero lower bound policy, both correlation analysis 
and multivariate regression analysis were performed. Each analysis is discussed as follows.  
4.1 Summary statistics and correlations 
	
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the data and for the variables. Panel A shows the 
summary for the whole sample and Panel B are the descriptions for the variables used in the 
study. From the number of observations of R&D and other data of interest, one can see that there 
are more than 3,000 missing R&D expenditures data in total. So to maintain sufficient data size, 
the analysis treats them as zero when performing the regressions.  
 
In addition, correlation analysis was run to see the correlations between variable ZLB and the 
managerial risk-taking proxies & ZLB and the executive compensation proxy. Table 2 shows the 
correlation results. Correlation coefficients that are significant at 1% level are marked with *. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
The sample includes all U.S. firm data available from the Compustat and Execucomp databases 
during the 2004 through 2014 period. Panel A reports descriptive values of sample firms over the 
entire sample period. Panel B reports descriptive statistics for variables used in the study. The 
variables presented in Panel B are defined in Appendix I.  
All variables in Panel B are Winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
 
Panel A: Descriptives 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Minimum Maximum 
Average Executive Compensation 
(Thousands) 
8778 2837 3010 96.93 72533 
Research and Development (Millions) 5331 302.5 937.5 0 10991 
Capital Expenditure (Millions) 8778 566.8 1986 -2285 47289 
Total Asset (Millions) 8778 10620 36774 52.24 797769 
Sales (Millions) 8778 8430 25710 2.960 474259 
Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 
(Millions) 
8778 1014 3301 -11982 66290 
Market Value (Millions) 8778 10418 30475 30.28 626550 
Book Value (Millions) 8778 3719 10727 -86154 174399 
Total Debt (Millions) 8778 717.7 8494 0 382407 
      
Panel B: Variables used in the study (Defined in Appendix I) 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Minimum Maximum 
AVE_TDC 8778 2.695 3.141 -1.268 20.15 
INVEST 8778 0.198 0.203 -0.170 1.284 
RD 8778 0.0563 0.104 0 0.668 
CAPEX 8778 0.140 0.164 -0.0903 0.955 
ZLB 8778 0.487 0.500 0 1 
SIZE 8778 7.819 1.512 4.887 11.79 
SALESG 8778 0.0716 0.177 -0.568 0.636 
EBIT 8778 0.253 0.286 -0.661 1.849 
MB 8778 2.964 2.708 -1.475 18.47 
DEBT 8778 0.0409 0.0837 0 0.554 
B-INDEX 8778 4.717 0.922 0 6 
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Table 2: Correlation analysis 
 
The sample includes all U.S. firm data available from the Compustat and Execucomp databases during the 2004 through 2014 period. 
ZLB is an indicator variable equal to one for the post-ZLB policy period (2009-2014), and equals to zero if otherwise. R&D is set 
equal to zero if R&D is missing. All remaining variables are defined in the Appendix I. Correlation coefficients with * are significant 
at the 1% level. 
 
Variable  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
AVE_TDC -           
INVEST 0.3157* -          
RD 0.3134* 0.5271* -         
CAPEX 0.1662* 0.8255* -0.00560 -        
ZLB -0.0314* -0.0489* -0.0342* -0.0408* -       
SIZE -0.4669* 0.1278* -0.0838* 0.2177* 0.1145* -      
SALESG -0.0237 0.0446* 0.0265 0.0317* -0.2101* -0.0433* -     
EBIT 0.1583* 0.2065* 0.0195 0.2544* -0.00930 0.1826* 0.1539* -    
MB 0.3748* 0.3185* 0.2909* 0.1883* -0.0928* 0.000 0.1021* 0.6122* -   
DEBT -0.0758* 0.0652* -0.0568* 0.1255* 0.0125 0.2398* -0.0725* 0.0274 -0.1222* -  
B-INDEX 0.1036* 0.0027 0.0853* -0.0611* 0.1366* -0.1879* -0.0232 -0.0361* 0.0093 -0.0917* - 
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One can see in Table 2 that AVE_TDC, INVEST, R&D, and CAPEX all have negative relations 
with the dummy variable ZLB. The negative relations are all significant at the 1% level. This 
correlation result does not contradict with the previous hypotheses that ZLB should be positively 
related with managerial risk-taking and executive compensation for all the risk measures are 
scaled by average book value of assets. To study the relations between the main variables of 
interest, one needs to account for control variables. Univariate analysis cannot fully reflect the 
relations that were investigated. Therefore, the analysis used the multivariate regressions to see 
the proposed relations correctly. The regression results are shown in the following sections. 
 
In addition, one can see that the correlation between AVE_TDC and the three risk-taking 
measures are all positively significant, suggesting a positive relation between compensation and 
risk-taking as shown in prior studies. 
 
Since the correlation results don’t show support for the hypotheses, the analysis also graphed the 
trends of R&D expenses and capital expenditures as shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2. From these 
two figures, one can clearly see an increase in R&D expenses and capital expenditures after 2009 
when the zero lower bound policy was first announced. The Federal Interest Rate graph is also 
presented in Figure 1. 
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 Figure 1: Historical Interest Rates 
Source: Federal Reserve (https://apps.newyorkfed.org/markets/autorates/fed%20funds) 
 
 
       Unit for R&D: Millions 
Figure 2: R&D Trends from 2004-2014 
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      Unit for Capital Expenditures: Millions 
Figure 3: Capital Expenditure Trends from 2004-2014 
 
4.2  Basic regression results 
 
To investigate deeper on the relations among zero lower bound policy, managerial risk-taking 
and executive compensation, the analysis estimated a series of regression equations consisting of 
control variables.  
 
4.2.1 Zero lower bound policy and managerial risk-taking 
 
 
To identify the link between zero lower bound policy and companies’ managerial risk-taking, the 
analysis estimated the regression of INVEST, R&D, and CAPEX on ZLB (a dummy variable 
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equals to 1 after zero lower bound policy and 0 otherwise) over the sample period as presented in 
Equations (1) to (3) below. 
 
 !"#$%&'( = *+ + *-./0 + *12'( + 3'(																					(1) 8&:'( = *+ + *-./0 + *12'( + 3'(																											(2) <=>$2'( = *+ + *-./0 + *12'( + 3'(																						(3) 
 
 
In all regressions, the analysis controlled for other variables that may affect managerial 
risk-taking (represented by X), such as firm size (SIZE), debt (DEBT), earnings before interest 
and taxes (EBIT), sales growth (SALESG), market to book ratio (MB) and b-index (B_INDEX). 
Furthermore, it accounted for any time-variant and firm-specific characteristics by introducing 
year-fixed and firm-fixed effects. The analysis clustered standard errors at the year dimension to 
account for any cross-sectional dependence of residuals due to the commonality of interest rates 
across firm observations. The results are reported in Table 3.  
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Table 3: Multivariate regression analysis 
 
The sample includes all U.S. firm data available from the Compustat and Execucomp databases 
during the 2004 through 2014 period. The dependent variable in Model (1) is INVEST, in Model 
(2) is R&D, and in Model (3) is CAPEX. ZLB is an indicator variable equal to one for the 
post-ZLB policy period (2009-2014), and equals to zero if otherwise. R&D is set equal to zero if 
R&D is missing. All remaining variables are defined in Appendix 1. The control variables are all 
lagged one year. All variables are Winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The estimates are from 
firm fixed and year fixed effects regressions. P-values are in brackets.  
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 INVEST RD CAPEX 
ZLB 0.059*** 0.022*** 0.034*** 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) 
SIZE -0.047*** -0.023*** -0.019** 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.007) 
DEBT 0.049 0.016 0.030 
 (0.048) (0.013) (0.039) 
EBIT -0.013 -0.012 0.008 
 (0.024) (0.010) (0.015) 
MB 0.024*** 0.007*** 0.014*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
SALESG -0.003 -0.007 0.004 
 (0.012) (0.005) (0.009) 
B-INDEX 0.001 0.001 -0.00009 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Constant  0.457*** 0.199*** 0.231*** 
 (0.072) (0.032) (0.053) 
Year-Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm-Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R2 0.128 0.076 0.097 
F 15.158 4.664 13.869 
N 8778 8778 8778 
                 Standard errors in parentheses 
                          + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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The results show that INVEST, R&D, and CAPEX increased significantly in the post-zero lower 
bound policy period, consistent with hypothesis H1a. For example, column 1 reports the 
regression results of INVEST being the dependent variable; the coefficient on the dummy 
variable is positive and significant at 0.1% level, indicating that INVEST was significant higher 
for sample firms in the post-zero lower bound policy period.  
 
Table 3 also reports similar results for R&D and CAPEX regressions. These results are consistent 
with the prediction that zero lower bound policy resulted in an increase in managerial risk-taking 
for publicly traded U.S. firms. Since our hypothesis is directional, we also decide to perform an 
on-sided test to see whether the coefficient of ZLB is indeed positive. The one-sided t-test results 
show that the possibility of a positive ZLB coefficient is 99.99% for all three risk-taking 
measures. Overall, all of the regression results show a significantly positive correlation between 
zero lower bound policy and managerial risk-taking, in support of hypothesis H1a. 
 
4.2.2 Mediation effect of managerial risk-taking 
 
According to Table 3, the results show support for hypothesis H1a that zero lower bound policy 
leads to an increase in managerial risk-taking. The positive relation between managerial 
risk-taking and executive compensation was already documented in prior research. Thus, this 
study proposed that the executive compensation increased after zero lower bund policy as a 
result of the mediation effect of managerial risk-taking. The analysis in this study used the 
mediation model proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986). In summary, the mediation model 
concerning zero lower bound policy, managerial risk-taking, and executive compensation as 
proposed is shown in Figure 4. 
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The figure represents relations between variables as well as their direct and indirect effects. 
All the coefficients besides the paths are defined as the coefficients in Equations (1) to (5). These 
are the coefficients are the ones needed to evaluate and test the mediation hypothesis.  
Figure 4: Path diagram for mediation 
 
The study used this three-step model to test for possible mediation effects. The first step was to 
test if there is a significant relation between zero lower bound policy and executive 
compensation. Equation (4) was used for this step. It mainly evaluated the significance of @-. 
The second step was to show that zero lower bound policy is positively related to managerial 
risk-taking. Since *- is positive and significant for H1, then it is already confirmed that zero 
lower bound policy can lead to an increase in managerial risk-taking. Finally, one has to see if 
zero lower bound policy and managerial risk-taking can impact executive compensation when 
they are both present in the regression. This regression was performed using Equation (5). In this 
regression equation, it focused on coefficients A- and A1. The regression results are presented in 
Table 4. 
 
                  =#$_&:<'( = @+ + @-./0 + @12'( + 3                        (4)  
                  =#$_:<'( = A+ + A-CDEF'( + A1./0 + AG2'( + 3                (5)  
Managerial Risk-taking 
Executive Compensation Zero Lower Bound Policy 
*-		 A1		
A- 
(@-) 
+ 
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Table 4: Mediation analysis  
 
The sample includes all U.S. firm data available from the Compustat and Execucomp databases 
during the 2004 through 2014 period. The dependent variable in all models is AVE_TDC. The 
independent variable in Model (1) is dummy variable ZLB, which equals to one for post-ZLB 
policy period (2009-2014) and zero for pre-ZLB policy period (2004-2008). The independent 
variable in Model (2) is ZLB and INVEST, in Model (3) is ZLB and R&D, and in Model (4) is 
ZLB and CAPEX. R&D is set equal to zero if R&D is missing. All remaining variables are 
defined in Appendix I. The control variables are all lagged one year. All variables are Winsorized 
at the 1% and 99% levels. The estimates are from firm fixed and year fixed effects regressions.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AVE_TDC 
 ZLB INVEST RD CAPEX 
ZLB 0.523*** 0.122 0.235+ 0.256* 
 (0.147) (0.128) (0.138) (0.130) 
INVEST  6.838***   
  (0.652)   
RD   13.123***  
   (1.893)  
CAPEX    7.900*** 
    (0.886) 
SIZE -1.507*** -1.185*** -1.210*** -1.354*** 
 (0.160) (0.142) (0.151) (0.148) 
DEBT 1.616** 1.280* 1.410** 1.378** 
 (0.491) (0.518) (0.488) (0.511) 
MB 0.371*** 0.209*** 0.279*** 0.262*** 
 (0.053) (0.041) (0.051) (0.046) 
EBIT -0.156 -0.069 0.008 -0.217 
 (0.301) (0.218) (0.248) (0.261) 
SALESG -0.684*** -0.665*** -0.587*** -0.714*** 
 (0.202) (0.176) (0.174) (0.186) 
B-INDEX 0.018 0.009 0.011 0.019 
 (0.040) (0.036) (0.038) (0.037) 
Constant  13.143*** 10.015*** 10.526*** 11.317*** 
 (1.300) (1.136) (1.207) (1.180) 
Year-Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm-Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R2 0.153 0.315 0.243 0.275 
F 19.424 27.169 23.963 24.894 
N 8778 8778 8778 8778 
             Standard errors in parentheses 
                    + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Model (1) in Table 4 is the regression results for ZLB and AVE_TDC. This model includes all 
the control variables but only has ZLB as the independent variable. The coefficient of ZLB is 
positive (0.523) and significant at 0.1% level, suggesting that there is an increase in executive 
compensation after the zero lower bound policy is implemented.  
 
Next, executive compensation on ZLB is regressed with managerial risk-taking measures. From 
the results of models (2) to (4), one can see that the coefficients for ZLB are not highly 
significant anymore. The coefficient for ZLB in Model (3), where R&D is the independent 
variable, is significant only at the 10% level. The coefficient is significant at the 5% level in 
Model (4). The most significance change is shown in Model (2) with INVEST as the 
independent variable. It is positive but not significant. However, the coefficients for risk-taking 
variables are highly significant at the 0.1% level. These results show that a partial mediation of 
risk-taking in the relation between zero lower bound policy and executive compensation is 
present. 
 
After testing for mediation, there is another possibility where ZLB can have an impact on 
managerial risk-taking and executive compensation. In other words, ZLB is moderating the 
relation between risk-taking and compensation. If zero lower bound policy is an acting 
moderator, then it means that the relation between managerial risk-taking and executive 
compensation can be increasing or decreasing after the implementation of the policy. According 
to the theory, if there should be a moderation effect present, then it should be positive.  
 
In short, the relation between managerial risk-taking and executive compensation becomes 
stronger after zero lower bound policy. This was not included as a hypothesis since there was not 
much theoretical evidence to believe in this possible relation. But based on existing evidence, 
when zero lower bound policy was implemented, the cost of money went down. It was shown 
that shareholders will award executives more for higher risk-taking (Conyon, 2006) and 
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shareholders may be induced to award executives more since the cost of money decreased. 
Therefore, it was decided to further test for moderation of ZLB. The following model was used: 
 
     =#$_:<'( = H+ + H-./0 + H1CDEF'( + HG./0×CDEF'( + HJ2'( + 3             (6)  
 
The result for possible moderation testing is reported in Table 5. In this table, one can see that the 
coefficients of all three risk-taking measures are positive and highly significant (at the 0.1% 
level). This confirms the conclusions documented in previous research that higher managerial 
risk-taking is positively related to higher executive compensation.  
 
The coefficients of the interaction terms in Model (2) and (4) are positive and significant at the 
10% and 5% levels. This suggests that zero lower bound policy is moderating the relation 
between INVEST and executive compensation, and CAPEX and executive compensation. But 
for Model (3) where R&D is the independent variable, the interaction term is not significant. It 
means that zero lower bound policy does not moderate the relation between R&D and executive 
compensation.  
 
One possible explanation would be that both managers and shareholders often treat R&D as a 
high-risk investment compared to capital expenditures (Kothari et al., 2002). Therefore, its 
relation with executive compensation does not change significantly after the implementation of 
zero lower bound policy because shareholders are aware of R&D’s high risk and wouldn’t 
reward managers more even if managers invest a lot in R&D. But since the cost of money is 
lower after the zero lower bound policy, shareholders may consider compensating managers 
more for investing more on capital expenditures such as property, plants and equipment.
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Table 5: Moderation analysis  
 
The sample includes all U.S. firm data available from the Compustat and Execucomp databases 
during the 2004 through 2014 period. The dependent variable in all models is AVE_TDC. The 
independent variable in Model (1) is dummy variable ZLB, which equals to one for post-ZLB 
policy period (2009-2014) and equals to zero if otherwise. The independent variable in Model (2) 
is ZLB, INVEST, and their interaction; in Model (3) is ZBL, R&D, and their interaction; and in 
Model (4) is ZLB, CAPEX, and their interaction. R&D is set equal to zero if R&D is missing. 
All remaining variables are defined in Appendix I. The control variables are all lagged one year. 
All variables are Winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AVE_TDC 
 ZLB INVEST RD CAPEX 
ZLB 0.523*** -0.049 0.179 0.057 
 (0.147) (0.147) (0.139) (0.138) 
INVEST  6.402***   
  (0.670)   
ZLB*INVEST  0.878+   
  (0.517)   
RD   12.611***  
   (1.878)  
ZLB*RD   1.045  
   (0.841)  
CAPEX    7.291*** 
    (0.870) 
ZLB*CAPEX    1.379* 
    (0.611) 
SIZE -1.507*** -1.182*** -1.200*** -1.362*** 
 (0.160) (0.142) (0.151) (0.149) 
DEBT 1.616** 1.281* 1.403** 1.396** 
 (0.491) (0.521) (0.492) (0.512) 
MB 0.371*** 0.211*** 0.280*** 0.264*** 
 (0.053) (0.041) (0.051) (0.046) 
EBIT -0.156 -0.106 -0.017 -0.240 
 (0.301) (0.221) (0.247) (0.262) 
SALESG -0.684*** -0.657*** -0.586*** -0.703*** 
 (0.202) (0.177) (0.175) (0.185) 
B-INDEX 0.018 0.007 0.011 0.017 
 (0.040) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) 
Constant  13.143*** 10.087*** 10.478*** 11.469*** 
 (1.300) (1.144) (1.206) (1.193) 
Year-Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm-Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  
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Adjusted R2 0.153 0.316 0.244 0.278 
F 19.424 25.923 23.103 23.846 
N 8778 8778 8778 8778 
               Standard errors in parentheses 
                       + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
In summary, the regression results conclude with the following four figures. Figure 5 shows the 
coefficients of each path for mediation. One can clearly see that all coefficients for path one 
(zero lower bound policy to managerial risk-taking) are highly significant at the 0.1% level for 
all three risk-taking measures. The same results are documented for path two (managerial 
risk-taking to executive compensation). All three coefficients are positive and significant at the 
0.1% level. For path three (zero lower bound policy to executive compensation), one can see that 
the coefficients are not very significant anymore.  
 
Especially for INVEST, the coefficient is 0.122 but not significant. The other two coefficients are 
significant at the 10% and 5% levels respectively. Originally, path three was 0.523 and 
significant at the 0.1% level before introducing managerial risk-taking into the relation. 
Therefore, one can conclude that by introducing managerial risk-taking, the relation between 
zero lower bound policy and executive compensation is significantly weakened. It even 
disappears when risk-taking is measured by INVEST. On the other hand, the relation between 
managerial risk-taking and executive compensation is highly significant for all risk-taking 
measures. 
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The figure summarizes the coefficients size and significance for both mediation models and 
moderation models. All the coefficients besides the paths are defined as the coefficients in 
Equations (1) to (5). The detailed results are reported in previous regression tables.  
Figure 5: Path diagram results for mediation 
 
 
Figure 6: Moderation graph for INVEST and AVE_TDC 
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Figure 7: Moderation graph for RD and AVE_TDC 
 
Figure 8: Moderation graph for CAPEX and AVE_TDC 
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For the moderation results, line graphs were used to show the interaction between zero lower 
bound policy and executive compensation. The line plots are shown in Figure 6, Figure 7 and 
Figure 8. Taking Figure 7 for example, the x-axis is RD and y-axis is AVE_TDC. The two lines 
represent the coefficient size before and after zero lower bound policy. By looking at Table 5, 
one can see that the coefficient RD is not significant. By looking at Figure 7, where the two lines 
represent the relation between managerial risk-taking and executive compensation before and 
after zero lower bound policy respectively, one can see that their slopes are almost identical.  
 
This suggests that even though there is a little change in the relation between managerial 
risk-taking and executive compensation after zero lower bound policy, it is not significant and 
small in size. Combining the results of Figure 6, Figure 7 and Figure 8, one can draw the 
conclusion that zero lower bound policy indeed strengthened the relation between managerial 
risk-taking and executive compensation a little, but it is significant compared with the mediation 
effect as discussed earlier. 
 
Therefore, by running both mediation and moderation models, there is sufficient evidence to 
support the hypothesis that managerial risk-taking is mediating the relation between zero lower 
bound policy and executive compensation. This mediation effect is partial mediation, which 
means that the increase in executive compensation is not only the result of the increase in 
managerial risk-taking due to zero lower bound policy, but also a direct impact of zero lower 
bound policy on executive compensation. 
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5 Robustness tests 
	
5.1 Considering industry differences 
 
Previous results are documented using models with firm-fixed effect and year-fixed effect. Even 
though it accounts for the differences between firms, it does not consider the differences between 
industries. Therefore, we feel the need to include industry fixed effect in our models and see if 
there is any difference due to the differences between industries.  
 
For our H1, we re-run the model with year-fixed effect and industry-fixed effects and results are 
documented in Table 6 below. The mediation results are documented in Table 7. 
 
Comparing the results in Table 6 and Table 3, we can see that there is not much difference. The 
significant levels of ZLB in all three models in Table 6 are all still at 0.1%. The coefficient size 
decreased by 0.01 for ZLB model 1, where INVEST is the dependent variable. Overall, we can 
conclude that the result holds for H1 where we find an increase in managerial risk-taking after 
zero lower bound policy. 
 
 
Comparing the results in Table 7 and Table 4, we can see that the coefficient size decreased 
slightly for both ZLB and risk-taking measures across all models. The only change in 
significance level is for CAPEX in model 4. When using industry-fixed effect, the significance 
level is at 10%, while using firm-fixed effect we can see 5% significance. Even though, there 
appear to have slight differences between the firm-fixed effect and industry-fixed effect. The 
main results for our hypotheses still hold. Therefore, we believe that our results are robust after 
considering the differences across all industries. 
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Table 6: Robustness test for H1 with industry-fixed effect 
 
The sample includes all U.S. firm data available from the Compustat and Execucomp databases 
during the 2004 through 2014 period. The dependent variable in Model (1) is INVEST, in Model 
(2) is R&D, and in Model (3) is CAPEX. ZLB is an indicator variable equal to one for the 
post-ZLB policy period (2009-2014), and equals to zero if otherwise. R&D is set equal to zero if 
R&D is missing. All remaining variables are defined in Appendix 1. The control variables are all 
lagged one year. All variables are Winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The estimates are from 
firm fixed and year fixed effects regressions. P-values are in brackets.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 INVEST RD CAPEX 
ZLB 0.058*** 0.022*** 0.034*** 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) 
SIZE -0.047*** -0.023*** -0.019** 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.007) 
DEBT 0.047 0.015 0.028 
 (0.048) (0.013) (0.039) 
EBIT -0.013 -0.013 0.008 
 (0.024) (0.010) (0.015) 
MB 0.024*** 0.007*** 0.014*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
SALESG -0.002 -0.008 0.004 
 (0.012) (0.005) (0.009) 
B-INDEX 0.001 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Constant 0.457*** 0.199*** 0.230*** 
 (0.073) (0.032) (0.054) 
Year-fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry-fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R2 0.128 0.076 0.097 
F 15.041 4.662 13.777 
N 8744 8744 8744 
                Standard errors in parentheses 
                        + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 7: Robustness test for H2 with industry-fixed effect 
 
The sample includes all U.S. firm data available from the Compustat and Execucomp databases 
during the 2004 through 2014 period. The dependent variable in all models is AVE_TDC. The 
independent variable in Model (1) is dummy variable ZLB, which equals to one for post-ZLB 
policy period (2009-2014) and zero for pre-ZLB policy period (2004-2008). The independent 
variable in Model (2) is ZLB and INVEST, in Model (3) is ZLB and R&D, and in Model (4) is 
ZLB and CAPEX. R&D is set equal to zero if R&D is missing. All remaining variables are 
defined in Appendix I. The control variables are all lagged one year. All variables are Winsorized 
at the 1% and 99% levels. The estimates are from firm fixed and year fixed effects regressions.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 AVE_TDC 
 ZLB INVEST RD CAPEX 
ZLB 0.514*** 0.116 0.227+ 0.249+ 
 (0.148) (0.128) (0.138) (0.130) 
INVEST  6.835***   
  (0.653)   
RD   13.179***  
   (1.893)  
CAPEX    7.883*** 
    (0.888) 
SIZE -1.500*** -1.179*** -1.203*** -1.348*** 
 (0.160) (0.142) (0.151) (0.149) 
DEBT 1.592** 1.272* 1.392** 1.368** 
 (0.495) (0.522) (0.491) (0.515) 
MB 0.371*** 0.209*** 0.279*** 0.263*** 
 (0.053) (0.041) (0.051) (0.046) 
EBIT -0.155 -0.067 0.010 -0.216 
 (0.301) (0.219) (0.248) (0.261) 
SALESG -0.667** -0.650*** -0.567** -0.700*** 
 (0.203) (0.177) (0.174) (0.187) 
B-INDEX 0.021 0.011 0.014 0.021 
 (0.040) (0.036) (0.038) (0.037) 
Constant  13.091*** 9.968*** 10.463*** 11.274*** 
 (1.302) (1.138) (1.208) (1.184) 
Year-fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry-fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R2 0.153 0.315 0.244 0.275 
F 19.341 27.062 23.882 24.784 
N 8744 8744 8744 8744 
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           Standard errors in parentheses 
                 + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
  
5.2 S&P 500 and non-S&P 500 firms 
	
 
Even though prior studies indicated that stock options tend to promote executives to take big 
risks, they also showed that high-risk investments are not all wise investments. One research 
study by Sanders (2001) showed that stock options result in managers taking more risk as 
expected, but managers also tend to make more acquisition transactions, which are generally 
seen as a form of value destroying (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Porter et al., 1996). This current 
study proposed the idea that stock options can induce risk-taking by executives, but not all 
risk-taking actions are value-increasing ones. For example, Huang et al. (2011) studied equity 
mutual funds, and find that when funds take excess risk; their performance is negatively 
impacted. 
 
This idea was developed more fully by Sanders et al. (2007). They found that stock options 
encourage CEOs to place relative large bets on uncertain investment categories such as R&D, 
capital expenditures and acquisitions. In turn, these risk-taking investments result in possible 
extreme corporate performance: big wins and big losses. 
 
Further empirical analysis showed that option-loaded CEOs delivered more big losses than big 
wins. Similar results were found in Bromiley’s (1991) study, where he found that poorly 
performing companies take higher risks and that risk-taking results in further poor performance. 
All the studies mentioned support the argument that not all risk-taking will generate higher 
returns for the company.  
 
Denis et al. (2003) found that because S&P 500 firms are more exposed to markets and media, 
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they are expected to generate higher future cash flows. At the same time, the market monitoring 
effect also has an impact on information asymmetry. According to Chen et al. (2004), firms that 
are included in the S&P 500 receive enhanced investor awareness. So managers may be forced to 
perform more efficiently and make wiser investment decisions due to investor and analyst 
monitoring. In addition, since these firms are highly exposed to the public, executives of these 
companies will make investment choices more discreetly for their reputations are at more risk if 
they fail to reach the expected performance goals.  
 
According to Jacobs (1991), managers are encouraged to reduce investments in R&D to avoid 
not meeting earnings targets that can result in institutional investors’ large-scale selling and a fall 
in stock prices. Porter (1991) also suggested that investors with short-term horizons can fail to 
recognize the future reward of long-term investments such as R&D. Empirical results 
documented by Bushee (1998) supported this view that managers sacrifice R&D for higher 
current earnings under the pressure of short-term oriented institutions. Therefore, due to the 
strong market monitoring mechanisms in place, managers of the S&P 500 companies may not be 
eager to invest in risky projects due to possible stock price falls.  
 
Thus, even though the study results show support for the positively significant relation between 
zero lower bound policy and managerial risk-taking, previous studies also suggested the 
possibility of market pressure moderating this relation. Therefore, if a company were more 
exposed to the market, then the tendency for executives to invest a lot in risky investments would 
be mitigated by the monitoring effect of the market.  
 
Therefore, the relation between zero lower bound policy and managerial risk-taking should be 
less significant for S&P 500 firms while the relation between managerial risk-taking and 
executive compensation should remain unchanged. At the same time, the mediation effect of 
managerial risk-taking for non-S&P 500 firms should still be present. Therefore, this study split 
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the samples into S&P 500 and non-S&P 500 firms to perform this robustness test. The regression 
results are presented in Table 8. 
 
 
For H1 concerning zero lower bound policy and managerial risk-taking, one can see in Table 6 
that for S&P 500 firms, the coefficient for ZLB is only significant at 10% for CAPEX and not 
significant for INVEST or R&D. For non-S&P 500 firms, all the coefficients for ZLB are all 
significant at the 0.1% level. In summary, S&P 500 firms only increased capital expenditures 
after zero lower bound policy while non-S&P 500 firms significantly increased in both R&D and 
capital expenditures. This difference is because non-S&P 500 firms are less exposed to the 
market and therefore have less to worry about. This result supports the previous prediction 
regarding the moderation effect of market pressure. 

The significance of CAPEX can be explained by the difference between R&D and capital 
expenditures. King and Wen (2011) believe that capital expenditure is a low-risk investment 
compared to R&D expenses. According to Coles et al. (2006), R&D expenses are considered as 
high risk investments compared to capital expenditures. Investors view capital expenditures as 
“good risk-taking” while R&D expenses represents “bad risk-taking”. Therefore, since managers 
of the S&P 500 firms need to worry about firms’ future performance and their reputations, they 
can only invest in “good risk-taking” that can let them to utilize the low nominal interest rate and 
protect themselves at the same time. 
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Table 8: Robustness test for S&P 500 and non-S&P 500 firms 
 
The sample includes all U.S. firm data available from the Compustat and Execucomp databases 
during the 2004 through 2014 period. The dependent variable in Models (1) and (4) are INVEST, 
in Models (2) and (5) are R&D, and in Model (3) and (6) are CAPEX. ZLB is an indicator 
variable equal to one for the post-ZLB policy period (2009-2014), and equals to zero if otherwise. 
R&D is set equal to zero if R&D is missing. All remaining variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
The control variables are all lagged one year. All variables are Winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
levels.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 SP=1 SP=0 
 INVEST RD CAPEX INVEST RD CAPEX 
ZLB 0.050 0.027+ 0.024 0.062*** 0.020*** 0.037*** 
 (0.035) (0.015) (0.027) (0.010) (0.005) (0.008) 
SIZE -0.050+ -0.027* -0.023 -0.046*** -0.022*** -0.019** 
 (0.028) (0.011) (0.021) (0.010) (0.005) (0.007) 
DEBT 0.065 0.040 0.015 0.047 0.012 0.033 
 (0.086) (0.027) (0.068) (0.053) (0.015) (0.043) 
EBIT 0.047 -0.009 0.060 -0.022 -0.012 -0.002 
 (0.067) (0.023) (0.040) (0.027) (0.011) (0.016) 
MB 0.017+ 0.005 0.009+ 0.025*** 0.007*** 0.014*** 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
SALESG 0.001 0.016 -0.022 -0.002 -0.010+ 0.008 
 (0.033) (0.015) (0.025) (0.014) (0.005) (0.010) 
B-INDEX -0.004 -0.000 -0.005 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Constant  0.518* 0.239* 0.287 0.444*** 0.194*** 0.221*** 
 (0.249) (0.101) (0.184) (0.076) (0.033) (0.056) 
Year-Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm-Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R2 0.166 0.070 0.143 0.121 0.078 0.088 
F 7.112 1.685 7.410 12.451 3.803 10.650 
N 1774 1774 1774 7004 7004 7004 
     Standard errors in parentheses 
        + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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In summary, the results indicate the moderation effect of market pressure for observing less 
significant results in S&P500 firms. 
 
5.3 Strong governance and weak governance firms 
 
When studying executive compensation, corporate governance is an important factor that needs 
to be considered. According to Core et al. (1999), when corporate governance structure is less 
effective, executives gain higher compensation. One important component of governance 
structure is the board of directors (BOD). The BOD is also the focus when studying corporate 
governance’s impact on executive compensation.  
 
Since the BOD is responsible for constructing executives’ compensation packages, it is expected 
to be free of the CEO’s influence to maximize value for shareholders. But this is often not the 
case in practice. In reality, people in the BOD are practically hired by the CEO and can also be 
removed by the CEO (Crystal, 1991). In addition, the BOD sometimes relies on outside 
consultants hired by the CEO when planning compensation contracts (Crystal, 1991). These can 
all have an impact on the BOD’s independence. Core et al. (1999) confirmed that the CEO earns 
greater compensation when the CEO is also the BOD chair and the outside directors are actually 
appointed by the CEO. Therefore, one can see the apparent impact of corporate governance on 
compensation. As a robustness check, the difference between strong and weak governance firms 
was studied. 
 
Since B-Index is composed of six parts and mainly measures the characteristics of the BOD, the 
robustness check was performed by separating high vs. low governance firms based on B-Index. 
The firms with strong corporate governance are defined as firms that have B-Index higher than 
the mean B-Index of the year, and are defined as weak governance if lower than the mean. The 
results are presented in Table 9. 
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Table 9: Robustness test for governance 
 
The sample includes all U.S. firm data available from the Compustat and Execucomp databases 
during the 2004 through 2014 period. The dependent variable in all the models is AVE_TDC. 
ZLB is an indicator variable equal to one for the post-ZLB policy period (2009-2014), and equals 
to zero if otherwise. R&D is set equal to zero if R&D is missing. All remaining variables are 
defined in Appendix 1. The control variables are all lagged one year. All variables are Winsorized 
at the 1% and 99% levels.  
AVE_TDC 
 High Governance Low Governance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ZLB INVEST RD CAPEX ZLB INVEST RD CAPEX 
ZLB 0.489* -0.030 0.178 0.204 0.865** 0.427* 0.461** 0.446* 
 (0.190) (0.176) (0.195) (0.177) (0.264) (0.177) (0.174) (0.182) 
INVEST  6.723***    7.570***   
  (0.667)    (1.178)   
RD   10.652***    17.055***  
   (1.765)    (3.463)  
CAPEX    7.685***    9.179*** 
    (0.835)    (1.597) 
SIZE -1.459*** -1.071*** -1.148*** -1.309*** -1.836*** -1.521*** -1.521*** -1.588*** 
 (0.217) (0.191) (0.208) (0.206) (0.256) (0.222) (0.230) (0.222) 
DEBT 1.239+ 1.099+ 1.301+ 0.999 1.984** 2.035** 1.682* 2.158** 
 (0.708) (0.651) (0.692) (0.657) (0.703) (0.753) (0.683) (0.808) 
MB 0.448*** 0.264*** 0.360*** 0.339*** 0.165+ 0.110+ 0.146* 0.102+ 
 (0.068) (0.053) (0.067) (0.057) (0.093) (0.058) (0.061) (0.061) 
EBIT -0.257 -0.185 -0.114 -0.429 -0.141 -0.203 -0.196 -0.121 
 (0.450) (0.318) (0.400) (0.380) (0.502) (0.406) (0.389) (0.405) 
SALESG -0.951*** -0.845*** -0.865*** -0.885*** -0.065 -0.101 0.054 -0.177 
 (0.273) (0.231) (0.241) (0.244) (0.235) (0.249) (0.239) (0.248) 
B-INDEX -0.033 -0.009 0.008 -0.025 0.147 0.084 0.116 0.091 
 (0.091) (0.078) (0.086) (0.079) (0.102) (0.091) (0.104) (0.090) 
Constant  12.785*** 9.225*** 9.964*** 11.100*** 16.041*** 12.540*** 12.998*** 13.159*** 
 (1.678) (1.460) (1.577) (1.578) (2.243) (1.932) (1.986) (1.937) 
Year-Fixed 
Effects 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm-Fixed 
Effects 
Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R2 0.186 0.330 0.241 0.290 0.094 0.302 0.266 0.277 
F 15.690 22.822 18.972 20.389 6.517 8.482 7.497 8.381 
N 5530 5530 5530 5530 3248 3248 3248 3248 
Standard errors in parentheses 
     + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Before performing the regression in Table 9, the analysis first explored the relation between zero 
lower bound policy and managerial risk-taking (not documented). All ZLB coefficients are 
positive and significant at the 0.1% level, meaning that managerial risk-taking increased after 
zero lower bound policy for both high and low governance firms. Then the mediation hypothesis 
was tested. 
 
Table 9 documents the results for mediation hypothesis. Models (1) to (4) represent high 
governance firms. One can see that the coefficient of ZLB in Model (1) is positive and 
significant at the 5% level, but not significant in Models (2) to (4). The coefficients of risk-taking 
measures are all significant at the 0.1% level in Model (2) to (4). Combining the results of 
Models (1) to (4), one can conclude that managerial risk-taking is acting as a full mediator in the 
relation between zero lower bound policy and executive compensation.  
 
This suggests that for high governance firms, zero lower bound policy does not have a direct 
impact on executive compensation. The proposed reason for this result is that when corporate 
governance is strong, executives have less influence over their compensation package. Therefore, 
the compensation can only by influenced by their risk-taking behaviors. 
 
Looking at Models (5) to (8), one can see that all the coefficients of ZLB are positive and 
significant and all the coefficients of risk-taking measures are also positively significant. This 
shows that managerial risk-taking is acting as a partial mediator in the relation between zero 
lower bound policy and executive compensation. This suggests that for weak governance firms, 
zero lower bound policy has a direct impact on executive compensation. This means the direct 
impact is due to the CEO’s influence over the compensation committee and in turn gains higher 
compensation. 
 
44	
	
In addition, when one compares the coefficient size of risk-taking measures across all models, 
one finds that the coefficients are larger for low governance firms, suggesting that high 
risk-taking have a bigger impact on compensation for firms with weak corporate governance. In 
summary, the result is consistent with the evidence provided in prior research confirming that 
weak corporate governance can result in executives’ direct impact over their compensation.  
6 Concluding remarks  
 
After the financial crisis of 2008, zero lower bound policy was in effect for over seven years 
until very recently. More and more questions have been raised in terms of its impact and whether 
this policy is appropriate for today’s economic situation. While journalists debated its impact on 
the national economy, researchers in the academic field tried to look at monetary policy’s impact 
from another perspective. There is a growing stream of literature investigating how companies 
react differently due to the implementation of zero lower bound policy. With this policy still in 
effect, this study may provide shareholders and investors a better insight as to how this policy is 
affecting firms’ managerial risk-taking and executive compensation. 
 
There have been many studies on zero lower bound policy’s impact on the banking and money 
fund industries. This literature provides direction for investigating other industries since the 
majority of companies are outside these two industries. With the widespread and profound 
influence of zero lower bound policy, there is a need to study its impact on companies in general 
because companies are playing an important role in the functioning of the financial market. By 
studying zero lower bound policy, one can provide an idea of how monetary policy can have an 
impact on companies’ risk-taking choices and compensation plans. 
 
These empirical results showed that after zero lower bound policy came into effect in December 
2008, companies took more risks than before and executives earned more as well. Further 
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analysis showed that part of the increase in executive compensation was caused by the mediation 
effect of managerial risk-taking. But there was also a direct positive impact of zero lower bound 
policy on executive compensation. The study also found that the relation between zero lower 
bound policy and managerial risk-taking was less significant for S&P 500 firms compared to 
non-S&P 500 firms. In addition for firms with strong corporate governance, zero lower bound 
policy did not have a direct impact on executive compensation, suggesting that the direct impact 
found in previous results may be due to executives’ impact on their compensation planning. 
However, further analysis is needed to confirm this idea. 
 
By extending the results of Di Maggio and Kacperczyk (2014), this study provided new evidence 
on the effects of zero lower bound policy on firms’ asset allocation decisions, shedding new light 
on the determinants of firms’ managerial risk-taking variations. It also provided indirect support 
for the idea that shareholders tend to prefer risky investments and encourage CEOs to take more 
risk by designing compensation plans with risk incentives. This study also has important 
practical implications for investors and boards of directors. They can gain better insight about 
CEOs’ risk taking behavior under zero lower bound policy. The compensation committees can 
provide more proper compensation plans accordingly.  
 
Our results are of importance for the time of low interest is still expected to last. Even though the 
Federal Reserve announced an interest rise on December 2015, the probability of an interest rate 
rise at the next Fed’s meeting is zero (Fortune News, 06/27/2016). Traders hold the belief that 
there is only an 8% possibility that there will be an interest increase this year. While people have 
no confidence in an interest rise, they believe that there is 10% of chance that the Federal 
Reserve would actually announce an interest cut in its July meeting. More than 20% chance of a 
likely rate cut in the future. Based on the expectations of the general public, we also believe that 
the time of low interest rate would not end so soon. Therefore, our results concerning managers’ 
risk-taking behavior and changes in their compensation should be able to provide some guidance 
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to policy makers as well as shareholders during the current time.  
 
There are a number of extensions possible to this study. Firstly, since it identified the mediation 
effect of managerial risk-taking on the relation of zero lower bound policy and executive 
compensation, one still cannot explain why it was only partial mediation. Therefore, there must 
be a mechanism that allows zero lower bound policy to directly influence executive 
compensation. It means that executives generally earned more after the implementation of the 
zero lower bound policy. Future research can look deeper to explain this direct impact.  
 
Secondly, we did not provide analysis across different industries. Based on the evidence provided 
in previous research, there are reasons to believe that companies in different industries can have 
various investment decisions as well as compensation structures. Therefore, it is possible that the 
relations discussed in this study may be different when studied cross-sectional. For instance, 
high-tech and low-tech firms might present distinct results for they differ in R&D intensity.  
 
Thirdly, we didn’t consider the impact of business cycle in our study. One might argue that the 
increase in managerial risk-taking and executive compensation is due to the decrease in interest 
rate instead of the zero lower bound policy. Therefore, for future study, we would like to include 
control variables in our models to account for the changes in macroeconomic business cycle. If 
including the business cycle controls do not change our results, we then have enough evidence to 
say that zero lower bound policy indeed lead to an increase in managerial risk-taking and 
executive compensation. In addition, we could also find another period of time where the interest 
rate is decreasing but not near zero and run the models again to compare with our current results. 
If we couldn’t find support for an increase in managerial risk-taking and the mediation effect of 
managerial risk-taking, then we would conclude that our result are robust. 
 
Finally, previous studies showed that risky investments tend to generate big losses more than big 
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gains. But with the interest rate as low as zero to 0.25%, there may be a difference in gains and 
losses for risky investments. So future research could look at the performance of high-risk 
companies under zero lower bound policy and see whether this policy has an impact on firm 
performance.  
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Appendix: Definitions of variables used in the study 
This appendix defines the variables used in the study. All the data are collected from the 
Compustat and Execucomp databases (Following Bargeron et al., JAE-2010). 
 
Executive compensation measure: 
• AVE_TDC is defined as the average executive compensation scaled by average book value of 
assets. 
 
Managerial risk-taking measures: 
• RD is defined as Research and Development Expense scaled by average book value of assets. 
• CAPEX is defined as (Capital Expenditures - Sale of property, plants and equipment) scaled 
by average book value of assets. 
• INVEST is defined as (RD+CAPEX). 
 
Control variables: 
• DEBT is defined as total debt scaled by lagged average market value of assets. 
• EBIT is defined as earnings before interest and taxes scaled by lagged average market value 
of assets. 
• MB is defined as the ratio between lagged market value of assets and lagged book value of 
assets. 
• SIZE is defined as the logarithm of (lagged average asset + 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
